Did War Cause the Abolition of New Zealand\u27s Provincial System? by Brett, Andre
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - 
Papers Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts 
1-1-2015 
Did War Cause the Abolition of New Zealand's Provincial System? 
Andre Brett 
University of Melbourne, abrett@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers 
 Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Brett, Andre, "Did War Cause the Abolition of New Zealand's Provincial System?" (2015). Faculty of Law, 
Humanities and the Arts - Papers. 3556. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/3556 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Did War Cause the Abolition of New Zealand's Provincial System? 
Abstract 
Some historians identify warfare in the North Island between settlers and Maori as the key to the abolition 
of New Zealand's provinces in 1876. This requires reconsideration. I suggest that warfare had notable but 
not dire consequences for provincialism, and that other issues were of greater significance. Although the 
central state gained powers during wartime, these rarely came at the expense of provincial powers. The 
botched implementation of the New Zealand Settlements Act, which has been cited as evidence of 
provincial failure, actually reflected poorly on both levels of government. The centralising impulse must be 
found elsewhere. Rather than being caused primarily by wartime expansion of the central state, major 
centralising reforms were more due to provincial mismanagement and reckless borrowing for public 
works that provoked a public desire for change. When settlers were presented with an alternative central 
vision of development, they embraced it and rejected the provinces. 
Keywords 
provincial, zealand's, abolition, cause, war, system?, did 
Disciplines 
Arts and Humanities | Law 
Publication Details 
Brett, A. (2015). Did War Cause the Abolition of New Zealand's Provincial System?. History Australia, 12 
(2), 165-187. 
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/3556 
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=raha20
History Australia
ISSN: 1449-0854 (Print) 1833-4881 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/raha20
Did War Cause the Abolition of New Zealand’s
Provincial System?
Andre Brett
To cite this article: Andre Brett (2015) Did War Cause the Abolition of New Zealand’s Provincial
System?, History Australia, 12:2, 165-187, DOI: 10.1080/14490854.2015.11668575
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/14490854.2015.11668575
Published online: 08 Feb 2016.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 9
View Crossmark data
Did war cause the abolition of New Zealand’s provincial system?
165
Did war cause the abolition of New 
Zealand’s provincial system?
André Brett
Some historians identify warfare in the North Island between settlers 
and Māori as the key to the abolition of New Zealand’s provinces in 1876. 
This requires reconsideration. I suggest that warfare had notable but not 
dire consequences for provincialism, and that other issues were of greater 
significance. Although the central state gained powers during wartime, 
these rarely came at the expense of provincial powers. The botched 
implementation of the New Zealand Settlements Act, which has been cited 
as evidence of provincial failure, actually reflected poorly on both levels 
of government. The centralising impulse must be found elsewhere. Rather 
than being caused primarily by wartime expansion of the central state, 
major centralising reforms were more due to provincial mismanagement 
and reckless borrowing for public works that provoked a public desire for 
change. When settlers were presented with an alternative central vision of 
development, they embraced it and rejected the provinces.
This article has been peer reviewed.
While New Zealand developed as a unitary state, this was by no means 
inevitable. It embarked on representative government in 1853 with a 
quasi-federal system of provincial governments that lasted for over two 
decades.1 Provincial abolition was approved by the central parliament 
in 1875 and became effective on 1 November 1876. New Zealand’s 
movement away from any semblance of federalism rather than towards it 
is distinctive – it is the only British settler society to dismantle a system of 
states or provinces. Many other colonies pursued an opposite trajectory, 
such as the unions that created the dominions of Australia, Canada, and 
South Africa. The surprising swiftness of the demise of provincialism has 
led historians to propose a range of theories to explain abolition, and one 
of the most persistent relates to the New Zealand Wars between Pākehā 
(white) settlers and Māori in the North Island during the 1860s.
1 The definitive work on the provincial system remains W. P. Morrell, The Provincial 
System in New Zealand 1852–76 (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1964 [1932]).
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Historians have argued across multiple generations that war generated 
the centralising forces that fatally encroached upon the provinces. B. J. 
Dalton put the warfare-as-centralisation argument concisely, stating that 
‘the great expansion in the central government’s activities’ was ‘necessary 
to match the new responsibilities of native policy and war from 1860 
onwards’.2 Similarly, Tony Ballantyne has suggested that the ‘key engine 
for political transformation was the conflict over land and sovereignty 
that raged from the end of the 1850s through to the early 1870s’, and 
that the wars were ‘an important impetus towards the centralisation 
of power in New Zealand’ by enlarging the central state and shifting 
emphasis away from the provinces.3 This argument was embedded in W. 
P. Morrell’s earlier study of the system. When he discussed the botched 
implementation of the New Zealand Settlements Act, he depicted it as a 
provincial failure, asking: ‘if the northern Provincial Governments could 
not colonise [under the Act], was not the strongest argument for their 
existence taken away?’4
The warfare-as-centralisation argument needs to be reconsidered. 
Warfare had notable but not dire consequences for provincialism; 
although it was a factor, other issues were of greater significance. 
Bernard Attard has recently argued that New Zealand’s centralisation 
was the result of the dynamics of colonial development and rising 
indebtedness rather than warfare.5 He does not, however, explore 
why wartime policies that would seem to have favoured centralisation 
were unsuccessful, and he implies that the demise of provincialism 
was inevitable. New Zealand’s demand for British capital, he argues, 
meant ‘the dynamic of settler developmentalism inevitably led to the 
centralisation of state power itself ’.6 This argument is predicated on 
acceptance of P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins’ ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ thesis 
that London financiers drove imperial expansion and development.7 Yet, 
2 B. J. Dalton, War and Politics in New Zealand 1855–1870 (Sydney: Sydney University 
Press, 1967), 12.
3 Tony Ballantyne, ‘The State, Politics and Power, 1769–1893’, in The New Oxford History 
of New Zealand, ed. Giselle Byrnes (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
112, 117.
4 Morrell, Provincial System, 152.
5 Bernard Attard, ‘From Free-Trade Imperialism to Structural Power: New Zealand and 
the Capital Market, 1856–68’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 35, no. 4 
(2007): 505–27; Bernard Attard, ‘Making the Colonial State: Development, Debt, and 
Warfare in New Zealand, 1853–76’, Australian Economic History Review 52, no.2 (2012): 
101–27.
6 Attard, ‘Making the Colonial State’, 103.
7 P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688–2000 (Harlow: Longman, 2002 
[1993]).
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New Zealand settlers demonstrated an assertive independent streak 
from the moment London granted the colony its first constitution in 
1846 – a flawed document that was unceremoniously rejected.8 Attard 
rigorously analyses the economic position of the provinces, but it 
is also necessary to interrogate what New Zealanders expected from 
their provincial governments, how they responded to failure, and 
what central actions most affected provincialism’s fortunes. Settlers 
placed their own needs and preferences in the foreground, not those of 
gentlemen capitalists. Abolition was only accomplished when centralists 
won the 1875–76 election, a de facto referendum on the existence of 
provinces.9 The provinces were neither abolished on instruction from 
the Colonial Office, nor because of coercion by financiers. They were 
abolished because electors chose abolition in response to the provinces’ 
demonstrated administrative failures.
Hence, building on the valuable insights of Attard’s work, I not only 
seek to fill his analytical gaps but also diverge from some of his con-
clusions, and argue that there was nothing inevitable in the demise of 
provincialism, since the forces underpinning abolition derived from 
the provinces’ own recklessness and mismanagement. This article first 
examines the powers acquired by the central government during wartime 
and whether they came at the expense of provincial authority. It then 
locates the centralising impulse elsewhere, but reveals that warfare – 
specifically loans to fund military activity – contributed to the timing 
of abolition. My previous research has shown that public works policy, 
especially with regard to railway expansion, runs as a common thread 
from the dawn of provincialism to its abolition.10 Here I dig deeper to 
show the relationship between war, public works, and the financial 
burdens both created. Greater agency must be ascribed to New Zealand’s 
settlers in the dismantling of provincial institutions. A clearer picture 
of why settlers disowned provincialism and what events made abolition 
attractive will enable a more thorough assessment of how substantially 
war contributed to New Zealand’s centralisation.
8 The standard study remains A. H. McLintock, Crown Colony Government in New Zealand 
(Wellington: R. E. Owen, 1958), but the best analysis is Sonia Cheyne, ‘Search for a 
Constitution: People and Politics in New Zealand’s Crown Colony Years’ (PhD thesis, 
University of Otago, 1975).
9 For a detailed study see J. L. Hunt, ‘The Election of 1875–6 and the Abolition of the 
Provinces’ (MA thesis, University of Auckland, 1961).
10 André Brett, ‘Dreaming on a Railway Track: Public Works and the Demise of New 
Zealand’s Provinces’, Journal of Transport History, 36, no. 1 (2015): 1–20.
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The limited centralisation of warfare
The provincial system at its creation in 1853 was a response to New 
Zealand’s dispersed Pākehā population and comprised six provinces based 
upon the main sites of settlement.11 In accordance with the provisions of 
the 1852 Constitution Act of the British parliament, each province had a 
unicameral council and a separately elected superintendent who possessed 
executive power but was neither responsible to, nor represented in, the 
provincial legislature. Above the provinces sat the bicameral General 
Assembly of the central government, which first met in Auckland in 
1854 and received responsibility in 1856 before relocating to Wellington 
in 1865. It possessed an elected lower house and an upper house 
nominated from the late 1850s on the advice of responsible ministers. 
Members at both levels were elected on a male property franchise that 
was generous but not universal, effectively excluding Māori as few held 
individual titles to land. In 1858, the New Provinces Act of the General 
Assembly permitted rapidly growing hinterland regions to secede from 
their province and form a new one. The system thereby grew to comprise 
10 provinces, although only nine existed at any one time. The key task 
of the provinces was to promote wider and deeper colonisation of New 
Zealand through immigration and public works. They began as powerful 
political entities: they, rather than the central government, maintained 
immigration agents, and they surveyed, built, maintained and operated 
bridges, harbours, railways and roads. Provincial councils sat before 
the General Assembly and enjoyed a wide range of powers, with only 13 
subjects of legislation – matters such as common weights and measures, 
customs duties and currency – under the central government’s exclusive 
jurisdiction.
From the outset, some politicians sought to increase the power of the 
provinces – ultra-provincialists led by William Fox even sought a fully 
federal system – while others asserted the primacy of central control. 
This has led to a simplistic analytical distinction between provincialists 
and centralists, but politics at both the national and provincial level 
11 This paragraph and the next draw upon the scholarship of D. G. Herron, whose work, 
although often overlooked, contains much analysis of a definitive character on 
1850s New Zealand politics. See ‘The Structure and Course of New Zealand Politics, 
1853–1858’ (PhD thesis, University of Otago, 1959); ‘Provincialism and Centralism, 
1853–1858’, in Studies of a Small Democracy: Essays in Honour of Willis Airey, ed. Robert 
Chapman and Keith Sinclair (Auckland: Blackwood and Janet Paul, 1963), 10–32; and 
‘The Circumstances and Effects of Sir George Grey’s Delay in Summoning the First 
New Zealand General Assembly’, Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand 8, no. 32 
(1959): 364–82.
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was defined more by shifting personal cliques, and the fervent localism 
was imported from Britain.12 D. G. Herron has refuted the existence of a 
binary divide of provincialists versus centralists during the 1850s: the 
extent to which politicians emphasised one or the other position was often 
dependent upon the offices they held and how (un)successful they were 
in forming government in the General Assembly.13 Provincial councils 
tended to stress the needs of provincial capitals and their ports, fostering 
discontent in rapidly expanding hinterlands that contributed much to 
provincial revenue but received few services in return. This discontent 
found expression in secessionist movements. Centralists, perceiving 
that the creation of small and weak new provinces would undermine the 
provincial system, joined with secessionists to secure the passage of the 
New Provinces Act, the first significant blow against provincialism.14
Was the second blow the outbreak of the New Zealand Wars in 
February 1860? I do not dispute Damon Salesa’s assertion that war 
‘forged the new self-governing colonial polity, [and] critically shaped 
settler subjectivities and institutions’ especially as a ‘workshop for … 
projects of racial amalgamation’.15 The reverberations of war are still felt 
in New Zealand’s race relations today. The colonial polity, however, was 
not a monolith, but a patchwork of provincial identities loosely gathered 
around a distant central authority – a point made emphatically by 
Ballantyne when he describes how the nation-state has been ‘deployed 
anachronistically’.16 Events that forged some facets of colonial life, such 
as the ‘racial crossings’ of intermarriage and intimacy studied by Salesa, 
had less significant consequences for provincialism. The survival of the 
provincial system was based upon its ability to advance public works 
and immigration as part of what James Belich calls the colonial progress 
industry, an ‘interacting complex of economic activities … centred on 
growth and development’ that formed a ‘motley whole … greater than the 
sum of its parts’.17 In New Zealand, as elsewhere, this industry comprised 
12 For more on the significance of localism in New Zealand and how it reflected British 
political traditions, see John Cookson, ‘How British? Local government in New Zealand 
to c.1930’, New Zealand Journal of History 41, no. 2 (2007): 143–60.
13 This is examined particularly strongly in Herron, ‘Provincialism and Centralism’. Note, 
however, that this binary became pronounced in the 1870s.
14 André Brett, ‘The Great Kiwi (Dis)Connect: The New Provinces Act of 1858 and its 
Consequences’, Melbourne Historical Journal 40 (2012), 129–48.
15 Damon Salesa, Racial Crossings: Race, Intermarriage, and the Victorian British Empire, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 181.
16 Tony Ballantyne, ‘On Place, Space and Mobility in Nineteenth-Century New Zealand’, 
New Zealand Journal of History 45, no. 1 (2011): 55.
17 James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-
World, 1783–1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 185.
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a steady stream of immigrants, the provision of easy credit, the existence 
of speculative markets, and the rapid creation of towns, farms, and public 
works.
The provinces, as institutions intended to be run by Pākehā for Pākehā, 
were not expected to determine Māori relations. Rather, as Pākehā 
settlement expanded, the provinces were expected only to administer 
to Pākehā wants and needs. Māori were on provincial society’s fringe; 
their connections to Pākehā were predominantly negotiated through the 
central government, missionaries and personal interaction, rather than by 
provincial organs. The Pākehā-centric role of provincial councils aligned 
with limitations placed upon the General Assembly in its early years. 
Governor Thomas Gore Browne implemented responsible government in 
1856, but expressly limited its responsibility to the Pākehā community. 
He reserved Māori affairs to himself and perceived them as an imperial 
rather than domestic concern. This decision appears to have been made 
on his own initiative, as there were no explicit instructions from the 
Colonial Office, but once he made the decision London supported it fully.18
The General Assembly, believing that its responsibility should not 
be limited, regarded Māori affairs as a domestic rather than imperial 
concern. In 1858 Browne granted the Assembly some responsibility 
for Māori affairs, explaining that ‘I retain to myself the executive and 
administrative part of native affairs, admitting my responsible advisers 
to full information, and granting them the right to advise me’, while 
reserving the right to pursue different courses of action and to veto 
legislation.19 The Colonial Office concurred, unwilling to relinquish 
control of Māori affairs to the General Assembly because of ‘the large 
expense which every year is incurred for the maintenance of a [British] 
military force in New Zealand’.20 The General Assembly was unimpressed. 
It proved reluctant to approve money for Māori affairs to be spent by a 
governor and staff who were not accountable to the electorate, and a 
stalemate developed between governor and parliament.21 Both governor 
and General Assembly coveted what powers the imperial government 
conceded and were reluctant to share or surrender them. In light of 
such events, it is unsurprising that the provinces were never granted 
18 Bruce A. Hunter, ‘The Transfer of Responsibility for Native Affairs from the Imperial 
Government to the General Assembly of the Colony of New Zealand’ (MA thesis, 
University of New Zealand 1949), 43–5.
19 Thomas Gore Browne to Colonial Secretary Edward Bulwer-Lytton, 14 October 1858, 
British Parliamentary Papers: Colonies; New Zealand (BPP).
20 Colonial Under-secretary Lord Carnarvon to Thomas Gore Browne, 18 May 1859, BPP.
21 Alan Ward, A Show of Justice: Racial ‘Amalgamation’ in Nineteenth Century New Zealand, 
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1974), 93.
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control over any aspect of Māori policy. Interactions between Māori and 
provincial governments were therefore peripheral to the operation of the 
provincial system, and it was little affected by New Zealand’s gradual 
acquisition of responsibility for Māori affairs or the expansion of central 
government organs for Māori administration.
Still, warfare between settlers and Māori in the central North Island 
had notable, albeit indirect, consequences for provincialism. The first 
phase of war began in Taranaki on the central western coast. Tensions 
between Pākehā and Māori became increasingly fraught throughout 
the 1850s in Taranaki because of a range of factors – most notably the 
collision of settler hunger for land with increasing Māori reluctance to 
sell, the rise of the Māori King movement, and the desire of the British 
to impose authority substantively on Māori.22 Open combat commenced 
in March 1860, and it soon became apparent that New Zealand had to 
bear the burden of considerable military expenditure. Initially, the 
central government sought to make Britain pay for the war, arguing New 
Zealand itself was incapable of affording it. Parliament – by 1860 home to 
a provincialist majority – resisted Edward Stafford’s ministry’s attempts 
to pay for the war out of surplus revenues that by law were given to the 
provinces.23 But as Britain was unwilling to subsidise a colonial war, the 
costs would soon come home to roost one way or another, and when they 
did, they had consequences for provincialism.
Taranaki was profoundly affected by war and joined the ranks of pauper 
provinces, a category previously only inhabited by weak new provinces. 
It was the smallest province by land area and the most vulnerable to 
upheaval. In 1858 it was home to 2650 Pākehā outnumbered by 3015 
Māori. Its capital New Plymouth, normally home to 937 people, became 
encircled and was flooded by almost the entire population of the province 
as well as British troops, and hundreds of women and children were 
evacuated to Nelson in the South Island.24 By late 1860, this exodus from 
the fighting meant the Pākehā civilian population plummeted to 1239 
and Māori now outnumbered them three-to-one.25 Tension developed 
between troops, civilians and provincial authorities; the territory under 
22 Still authoritative is Keith Sinclair, The Origins of the Maori Wars (Wellington: New 
Zealand University Press, 1961 [1957]). See also James Belich, The New Zealand Wars 
and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict (Auckland: Auckland University 
Press, 1986), 75–80 and Alan Ward, ‘The Origins of the Anglo–Maori Wars: A 
Reconsideration’, New Zealand Journal of History 1, no. 2 (1967): 148–70.
23 Morrell, Provincial System, 118.
24 Natasha Andrea Elliot-Hogg, ‘The Taranaki Refugees 1860’ (MA thesis, University of 
Waikato 1999), 9–17.
25 Statistics of New Zealand, 1858–60.
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the provincial government’s control essentially shrank to New Plymouth 
alone. Taranaki struggled to handle the problems of such close, crowded 
living – fire and health hazards, panic when bad news arrived and settler 
dissatisfaction with military measures not considered to be sufficiently 
decisive.26 Basic provincial functions were suspended for most of 1860, 
and the unsettled condition of the province – even after a shaky peace 
was established in 1861 – meant that Taranaki could not hope to raise 
either sufficient revenue or a loan to cover its costs, compensate settlers 
for losses, and resume its role in the progress industry. It was reduced 
to surviving on central government support and pleas for loans raised 
on colonial security.27 Taranaki’s destitution, however, was a problem 
largely confined within its borders – other North Island provinces were 
not severely affected. It may have joined Hawke’s Bay and Marlborough 
in the ranks of poor provinces and proven that original provinces were 
susceptible to failure as well as new provinces, but it was a localised 
problem rather than an indictment of the entire system of government.
More significant consequences came when warfare spread into 
Auckland Province. War justified central government participation in 
immigration, settlement and public works, which had been exclusively 
provincial domains since 1853. Initially, this was through construction 
of public works required by the military, a job conducted by both colonial 
and imperial authorities. The need for military roads in Taranaki and 
Auckland ran well ahead of the transport needs of settlers. When George 
Grey arrived in Auckland in 1861 to resume the title of governor, he was 
acutely aware that although Taranaki was nominally at peace, fighting 
could spread quickly to Auckland’s Waikato region. This was of grave 
concern, as the approach from the Waikato into southern Auckland was 
poorly defended. Grey authorised the construction of a military road, 
the Great South Road, ostensibly for defence but with the clear double 
purpose of facilitating invasion of the Waikato.28
Despite appearances, this road-building activity does not represent 
central expansion at the expense of the provinces. The justification for 
the foray into the provincial domain was purely military and could not 
have occurred otherwise. In June 1862 the military expressly ordered 
that troops were ‘on no account to be employed on roads designed for 
26 Richard S. Hill, Policing the Colonial Frontier: The Theory and Practice of Coercive Social and 
Racial Control in New Zealand, 1767–1867 (Wellington: V R Ward, 1986), 518–9.
27 Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives 1861 B-05, 6 (AJHR); AJHR 
1862 A-11 and B-01, 5; Elliot-Hogg, ‘The Taranaki Refugees’, 71–3.
28 J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey KCB, 1812–1898: A Study in Colonial Government (London: 
Cassell, 1961), 464.
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the convenience of private individuals, but only on roads … constructed 
for the defence of the settlement’.29 John Larkins Cheese Richardson, a 
government minister appointed as commissioner into imperial claims 
against the central government, emphasised that although roads like 
the Great South Road were ‘of benefit to the Colony, [they] would not 
… have been undertaken by it for many years to come’.30 Attempts by 
Wellingtonians to persuade the central government that road con-
struction in their province offered military advantages saw no result.31 
As war was not a provincial concern, it made sense for imperial and 
col onial funds to be used for constructing military-related works, but 
the policy’s influence was limited. It could never have affected public 
works in the South Island, or even in areas of the North Island beyond 
conflict zones.
On the basis of restoring peace and prosperity after the war, the 
central government did however attempt to usurp some provincial 
power. This was originally through a proposal of Alfred Domett’s central 
ministry and then through the New Zealand Settlements Act. When the 
Domett ministry fell in October 1863, it was considering a vast plan for 
military roads and settlements throughout the North Island. This plan 
was conceived not just to secure a temporary military victory that could 
evaporate upon the withdrawal of troops. It sought complete subjugation 
of the Māori world to Pākehā by confiscating tracts of land on which a 
chain of Pākehā settlements would be established.32 Pākehā population 
would thus overwhelm Māori power. The plan appears to derive at least 
somewhat from policies Grey implemented as governor of the Cape Colony 
in South Africa, modified to suit New Zealand circumstances. However, 
his increasing opposition to confiscation in subsequent years indicates 
Domett and his ministers were the primary authors.33 Domett’s influence 
is certainly apparent: he was profoundly ignorant of Māori culture despite 
a 21-year residency in New Zealand. His stern, confrontational approach 
was activated by the grossly mistaken belief that the only diplomacy 
Māori understood was that ‘might is right’.34
29 G. S. Whitmore, Assistant Military Secretary, to George Grey’s Private Secretary, 7 June 
1852, AJHR 1862 A-06E, 8.
30 AJHR 1867 B-05A, 6.
31 Wellington Independent, 21 February 1862, 2.
32 AJHR 1863, A-08A, 1.
33 Michael Allen, ‘An Illusory Power? Metropole, Colony and Land Confiscation in New 
Zealand, 1863–1865’, in Raupatu: The Confiscation of Māori Land, ed. Richard Boast and 
Richard S. Hill (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2009), 115.
34 E. A. Horsman, The Diary of Alfred Domett, 1872–1885 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1953), 30–5.
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Domett’s ministry was replaced by an alliance between Frederick 
Whitaker and William Fox, with the former as premier. The Whitaker–
Fox ministry was dominated by the aggressive Māori policy of Auckland 
businessmen and land speculators, notably Whitaker himself and 
his talented legal partner Thomas Russell. Both had much to gain 
by confiscating Māori land.35 On entering office, Whitaker assumed 
full responsibility for Māori affairs, placing Grey in easily his weakest 
constitutional position in New Zealand.36 But the continued presence of 
imperial troops meant Grey had an undefined veto over defence matters, 
creating uncertainty over who held ultimate power.37
Three items of legislation characterised Whitaker’s policy and Grey 
assented to them despite personal qualms – the Suppression of Rebellion 
Act, which suspended habeas corpus, the New Zealand Settlements Act to 
confiscate swathes of Māori land, and the New Zealand Loan Act to raise 
£3 million to cover the first two acts and the cost of the war. The latter 
two acts are significant for provincialism. The Settlements Act was based 
on a long British imperial history of military pacification and settlement, 
drawing especially on Irish and southern African precedent; it was not 
an anomalous act of land-hungry settler politics.38 It was also based on 
another history, this one only months long: Domett’s proposals for road-
building and settlement, which survived the ministerial transition.
The Settlements Act was an act not simply to confiscate Māori land 
throughout the North Island, but also to settle it – under the auspices of 
the central government but with provincial involvement. It provided for 
the governor-in-council to reserve land for settlement in any district in 
which Māori had fought against the Crown, with compensation granted 
to Māori who had supported the Crown.39 The Loan Act authorised £3 
million to be raised in Britain at a rate of 5 per cent; the government 
believed it would meet repayments by selling 1.5 million acres at £2 an 
acre.40 Relevant charges for the settlement program were £300,000 for 
the introduction of settlers to the North Island and £900,000 for surveys 
and public works – and crucially the provinces were to be involved in the 
program. This point is often overlooked in arguments that quickly assume 
35 Russell Stone, ‘Russell, Thomas’, Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, accessed 10 June 
2013, http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/biographies.
36 Rutherford, Grey, 496.
37 Allen, ‘An Illusory Power?’, 120.
38 Richard Boast, Buying the Land, Selling the Land: Governments and Maori Land in the North 
Island, 1865–1921 (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2008), 50–55.
39 New Zealand Settlement Act 1863 (27 Victoria, No. 8). See especially clauses 2–5.
40 Bryan Gilling, ‘Ruapatu: The Punitive Confiscation of Māori Land in the 1860s’, in 
Raupatu, ed. Boast and Hill, 17–18.
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the war was, in Ballantyne’s words, the ‘key engine’ for centralisation. 
As the provinces administered immigration and public works, the Loan 
Appropriation Act delegated the money raised to the provinces in which 
the settlement would occur; primarily Auckland, with Taranaki a distant 
second. If land revenue were insufficient to repay the interest and sinking 
fund to the central government for ‘all sums expended in any Province 
for the permanent advantage of such Province’, it would be made a charge 
on the province’s general revenue.41 To achieve their objective, the central 
government still had to work with the provinces.
The scheme was not successful either as a driver of centralisation or for 
its intended purpose of settlement. It did lead to swathes of confiscation 
in a legally dubious process that has left a harsh legacy for Māori.42 
Confiscating land was one thing; settling it another. At the time the acts 
were passed, there was little opposition. Henry Sewell, a rare dissenter, 
alleged they were hurried through parliament with poor oversight, no 
detailed estimates and insufficient time for members to consider the 
proposal.43 The subsequent difficulties substantiate his fears. As previous 
authors have indicated at length, it was hard to carry out the scheme when 
neither Grey nor the Colonial Office were willing to give full support to 
the ministry.44 In short, the Colonial Office urged caution and the inability 
of Grey and Whitaker to agree on the details of confiscation delayed the 
process. Whitaker wanted to proceed speedily and saw confiscation as 
a means of defraying wartime expenses; Grey viewed confiscation as a 
form of punishment; in the end the differences were irreconcilable and 
the ministry resigned. It was replaced by a ministry led by Frederick 
Weld, whose dislike for Grey was decidedly reciprocated, and this did not 
bode well for Weld’s policy of New Zealand becoming ‘self-reliant’ and 
taking on all costs of war and settlement.45
Worse still were arrangements for immigration. The land was to be 
occupied by military settlers and liberal enlistment terms helped attract 
recruits, but in haste the government chose quantity over quality.46 
Military settlers swept into Auckland and Taranaki before the war was 
41 Loan Appropriation Act, 1863 (27 Victoria No. 12).
42 Gilling, ‘Raupatu’, 19.
43 Henry Sewell, The New Zealand Native Rebellion: Letter to Lord Lyttelton (Auckland: 
Printed for the author, 1864).
44 Allen, ‘An Illusory Power?’, 131; Hunter, ‘Transfer of Responsibility for Native Affairs, 
170–83’; Morrell, Provincial System, 146; Rutherford, Grey, 498–99 and 509–15.
45 Rutherford, George Grey, 516–20.
46 Ross Hamilton, ‘Military Vision and Economic Reality: The Failure of the Military 
Settlement Scheme in the Waikato, 1863–1880’ (MA thesis, University of Auckland, 
1968), 103
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even over: 5124 arrived in Auckland before the December 1864 census, 
comprising over 8 per cent of the province’s population.47 Many ex-
perienced lengthy stays in barracks and were even used as auxiliary 
troops rather than settling on confiscated land.48 Once the settlers were 
sent on to the land, they received inadequate provisions and complained 
of neglect.49 Those granted land near Cambridge and Pirongia soon 
requested military protection of their own, prompting howls of derision 
from the south.50 Periodic fears war would resume caused many settlers 
to retreat to the safety of townships until the scare passed, hobbling their 
farms’ performance.
The scheme was visibly crumbling in execution. So too were its finances. 
By November 1864 emigration agents were complaining that they had 
not received sufficient money. In January 1865 they were forced to 
suspend operations.51 Both central and provincial governments struggled 
to hold up their end of the bargain. A compromise was reached where 
confiscated Waikato land was transferred to Auckland’s control with a 
small royalty per acre paid to the central government, but the province 
could not maintain the expenses of surveying, constructing public works 
and employing settlers. A similar scheme for Taranaki was abandoned, 
Auckland could not raise a loan to cover costs except at a ruinous discount, 
and in the end land reverted to central management.52 By mid-1867, far 
from recouping the loan, land sales had earned just £25,000.53
The whole shambles casts neither central nor provincial government in 
a good light. It is hard to sustain Morrell’s conclusion that Auckland was 
unable to manage its own colonisation and that provincialism in the North 
thereby lost its strongest argument for existence. Much responsibility for 
the poorly implemented scheme lay with the central government, and 
Auckland inherited it on the brink of collapse. If Morrell’s assertion is to 
be accepted, then we must also accept that the central government could 
not colonise the North Island and had lost justification for its existence. 
The Settlements Act was a bold central vision that successive ministries 
attempted to realise with little obvious competence. It was a portent that 
central and provincial authorities would find it difficult to work together 
on a vast colonising scheme, but it was also an ideological dead end – 
47 Statistics of New Zealand, 1864.
48 Otago Daily Times, 15 March 1864, 4.
49 Taranaki Herald, 25 June 1864, 2.
50 Daily Southern Cross, 27 September 1864, 4; Press, 10 October 1864, 2.
51 AJHR 1865 D-03, 11–15.
52 AJHR 1865, D-02 and D-02A; AJHR 1866 A-02, A-02A, and A-02B.
53 AJHR 1867 A-08.
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military settlements were never again the cornerstone of development 
policy. The centralisation of the 1870s was justified for different, largely 
disconnected reasons. As a geographically isolated program, settlement 
under the Settlements Act did not allow significant central encroachment 
on the provincial domain, especially those provinces outside of the theatre 
of war; as a botched program, it did not achieve significant centralisation 
in the provinces it affected; as the source of a centralising impulse, it is 
not terribly compelling.
War and the timing of centralisation
As wartime policies did not undermine provincial power, where then 
should the origins of New Zealand’s centralisation be located? The 
problems of provincialism would have required resolution with or 
without war, but the central government’s wartime actions help explain 
the precise timing of centralisation. This is largely in line with Attard’s 
previous research, but his argumentation is confined to economic 
considerations that only provide part of the picture. He suggests that 
centralisation was necessary to mobilise capital and that war brought 
attention to incompatibilities between metropolitan money markets and 
New Zealand’s allegedly unsatisfactory institutional structure.54 This 
interpretation downplays the initial provincial successes in mobilising 
capital, the significance of maladministration and mismanagement, and 
that settlers at elections were responding not to international financing 
and negotiations, but to their lived experience of which institutions best 
met their needs. A consideration of the broader social and political forces 
of provincial-era New Zealand reveals that the problems of provincialism 
that required resolution were not inherently fatal flaws of institutional 
design, but were created by provincial governments themselves.
Electors had high expectations of provincial governments in the 1850s 
but the approach of most to public works and finances did not, to put 
it mildly, reveal a capacity to meet these expectations. The provinces 
experienced significant difficulties with public works, which were under-
mined by factors as diverse as labour shortages, petty rivalries and 
misplaced priorities.55 There were frequent failures in providing well-
made roads, bridges and harbour works. Problems were most pronounced 
in provincial hinterlands, where a profound lack of investment motivated 
54 Attard, ‘Making the Colonial State’, 122.
55 Brett, ‘Dreaming on a Railway Track’.
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the campaign culminating in the New Provinces Act of 1858. Between 
November 1858 and April 1861, three new provinces – Hawke’s Bay 
(ex-Wellington), Marlborough (ex-Nelson) and Southland (ex-Otago) – 
secured a divorce from their original province.56
The system having been destabilised through the passage of the New 
Provinces Act, the lack of development in the 1850s then provoked an 
orgy of loans. Instead of reflecting on how best to mobilise their own 
resources or imposing income taxation, the provinces hoped to resolve 
their problems quickly by turning to external capital. This option had 
been little explored: borrowing was light prior to 1861. Attard highlights 
that Stafford’s central ministry of 1856–61 secured an imperial 
guarantee for a £500,000 loan and feared the effects of provincial 
borrowing. The central loan was secured on the colony’s entire revenue, 
including that assigned to the provinces, but a province weighed down by 
its own liabilities might have been incapable of contributing its portion 
of the loan charges.57 Hence Stafford and Governor Browne both had 
an interest in limiting provincial borrowing. But in 1861, the Stafford 
ministry fell, largely because of a backlash against its centralist policies.58 
Its more provincialist successors, the Fox and Domett ministries, were 
sympathetic to provincial loans. Furthermore, the Stafford ministry in 
1860 did approve a £300,000 loan for Canterbury to fund an audacious 
public works project: a railway tunnel linking Christchurch with its 
port Lyttelton.59 This was meant to be an exceptional case with security 
derived from the province’s flourishing land sales, but the change in 
ministries and the replacement of Browne by Grey saw the arrival of a 
governor willing to apply the Canterbury precedent to other provincial 
railway proposals.60
Politicians in most provinces began borrowing recklessly for public 
works to stimulate development. The central government agreed to 
a glittering array of loans for provinces eager to fulfil lofty hopes, 
compensate for lost time and exploit their natural resources. Provincial 
56 Notable accounts of provincial secessions can be found in D. M. Tebay, ‘The Hawke’s 
Bay Separation Movement, 1856–58’ (MA thesis, University of New Zealand, 1954); A. 
D. McIntosh, ed., Marlborough: A Provincial History (Christchurch: Capper Press, 1977 
[1940]), 193–206; and for Southland, A. H. McLintock, The History of Otago: The Origins 
and Growth of a Wakefield Class Settlement (Dunedin: Otago Centennial Historical 
Publications, 1949), 408–11.
57 Attard, ‘From Free-Trade Imperialism’, 509; Attard, ‘Colonial State’, 109–11.
58 Morrell, Provincial System, 116–21.
59 The saga of Canterbury’s railway ambitions, led by William Sefton Moorhouse, is best 
recounted by W. H. Scotter, ‘Canterbury, 1857–68’, in A History of Canterbury, ed. W. J. 
Gardner, vol. 2 (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1971), 77–104.
60 Attard, ‘Colonial State’, 116.
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loans totalling £2,081,000 were approved in 1862–63, of which the 
Domett ministry alone approved £1,871,000.61 This was not in itself 
abnormal. Australasian colonies were particularly active in public works, 
as revealed by Davis and Huttenback’s striking data. State expenditure in 
Australasia was three times that of the average developed country, and 
even other similarly young regions had much lower levels of expenditure.62 
Public works such as railways were placed under state authority in New 
Zealand not simply because government had access to cheaper finance 
than private borrowers, but because these works served a developmental 
purpose, deepened settlement, and facilitated economic growth.63 Rail-
ways were prominent in the colonial imagination from the 1850s and 
settlers deemed essential the rapid provision of infrastructure.64 When 
the provinces made their first major forays on to the market in the early 
1860s, they secured capital. It might not have been inevitable that the 
state became heavily involved in public works construction and financing, 
but it is unsurprising.
Fatefully for provincialism, one mismanaged railway project brought 
an entire province unstuck. Some overly ambitious plans were rejected 
by the central government; for example, Fox condemned a foolhardy 
Marlborough bid for a railway loan because of inadequate financial 
data.65 Unfortunately, however, two Southland railway loans totalling 
£250,000 were approved. Southland, seething that secession came just 
before Otago grew wealthy from its gold rush, proposed grandiose public 
works to divert the gold trade from Dunedin to Southland. In haste, it 
built an experimental wooden railway that became a farce. Consequently 
Southland did not see a return on its investment and went bankrupt.66 
By mid-1864, its provincial bonds were unsaleable in London and it was 
bailed out by the central government, placing considerable burdens on 
New Zealand’s finances and creditworthiness. Worse, Southland was just 
the leading example of a province that had borrowed much but achieved 
61 AJHR 1868 B-06.
62 Lance E. Davis and Robert A. Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The 
Political Economy of British Imperialism, 1860–1932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986), 127–9.
63 G. R. Hawke, The Making of New Zealand: An Economic History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), 106.
64 André Brett, ‘A Limited Express or Stopping all Stations? Railways and Nineteenth-
century New Zealand’, Journal of New Zealand Studies 16 (2013): 131–46.
65 William Fox to the superintendent of Marlborough, 5 September 1861, AJHR 1862 A-3, 
8–9.
66 Brett, ‘Great Kiwi (Dis)Connect’, 142–4. For more on Southland’s wooden railway, see J. 
O. P. Watt, Southland’s Pioneer Railways 1864–1878 (Wellington: New Zealand Railway 
and Locomotive Society, 1965).
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little thanks to poor decision-making. Not even large and populous 
provinces avoided embarrassment. An 1863 provincial select committee 
condemned management of road construction in Otago, especially the 
exorbitant costs incurred; a dispute between Wellington’s superintendent 
and a hostile council brought public works to a standstill in 1858–61, 
ensuring that fertile hinterlands went without cheap transport to 
markets; and attempts to bridge the dangerous Waitaki River that 
formed the border between Canterbury and Otago were delayed for years 
by interprovincial bickering.67 
At the same time as provincial mismanagement stalled New Zealand’s 
development, deleterious results for provincialism were created by a 
combination of decisions in London and actions taken by the central 
government to fund the war. From late 1863 the London Stock Exchange, 
mistrustful of obscure colonial borrowers, chose to treat the provinces 
as if they were colonial municipalities and declined to quote provincial 
bonds. Attard’s research has found the precise reasons for this course 
of action unclear, but the failure of the Canadian government to take 
responsibility for a recent default by the City of Hamilton was influential 
and put the colonies out of favour with investors.68 Consequently, pro-
vincial loans could not be raised except at deep discounts. Worse still, 
when the central government floated its £3 million loan to fund the war 
and the Settlements Act, it clashed with provincial loans already on the 
market. The provinces were furious. The Press in Christchurch argued 
that the ‘General Government has killed our credit’.69 Otago failed to 
negotiate £650,000 of debentures in London, and Superintendent John 
Hyde Harris blamed competition with the £3 million loan as well as 
the lack of a guarantee from the central government and a perceived 
misapprehension by British investors of the security offered by the 
provinces.70 These were common complaints, especially among South 
Island provinces eager for money to further development schemes. The 
Daily News of Invercargill repeated the charges multiple times before 
Southland’s financial collapse became public knowledge.71 Money was 
67 ‘Roads and their Construction’, reports of select committees no. 3, Votes and 
Proceedings of the Otago Provincial Council, session 17, 1863; Wellington Independent, 
25 April 1863, 2; Oamaru Times, 31 May 1866, 2; see also A. P. F. Browne, ‘The Otago 
Goldfields 1861–1863: Administration and Public Life’ (MA thesis, University of 
Otago, 1974), 142–8 for a discussion of Otago’s tardiness in construction of roads to 
the goldfields.
68 Attard, ‘From Free-Trade Imperialism’, 512–13; ‘Colonial State’, 118.
69 Press, 31 March 1864, 2.
70 Otago Daily Times, 8 April 1864, 4.
71 Daily News, 13 April 1864, 4; 16 April 1864, 4.
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now hard to obtain, and borrowers who had already proved to be bad 
managers were going to find it most difficult.
To compound New Zealand’s financial woes, the central government 
encountered problems raising the £3 million loan. The Weld ministry, 
overly confident in the loan’s success, spent money with advances from 
the Bank of New Zealand while Reader Wood negotiated the loan in 
London. Wood requested that Britain guarantee the full loan but was 
rebuffed; a guarantee for only £1 million was forthcoming, covering 
the portion of the loan for military expenses but not the Settlements 
Act scheme.72 Worse followed when the first debentures were placed on 
sale. Only £6,100 of £1 million were bought on the first day, increasing 
to approximately £30,000 during the next 10 days.73 The loan suffered 
from numerous factors, including the general state of the money market, 
criticisms of New Zealand during the British parliament’s debate on 
guaranteeing the loan, and the shift of the main theatre of war to the 
Bay of Plenty. One of the most significant factors was, in the words of the 
crown agents, ‘the unfortunate manner in which some of the Provincial 
Loans have been dealt with in this market’.74
The provinces emerged the loser from this collision of provincial public 
works investment with central war expenditure. The central government 
increased the £3 million loan’s interest rate from five to six percent 
to make it a more attractive investment, and authority was given for 
£1 million of short-dated debentures to be issued at eight percent to 
provide a quick injection of funds. The government’s overdraft with 
the Bank of New Zealand ballooned to £818,000, causing the bank no 
small measure of difficulties.75 However, in fits and starts the loan was 
successfully raised, and by 1867 central credit had recovered.76 Provincial 
governments, on the other hand, remained in difficulties and their public 
works proceeded erratically. This situation required resolution anyway 
– not to mobilise capital as in Attard’s interpretation, but to provide 
sound administration of essential public works. Settlers grew impatient 
and began looking elsewhere for an authority with greater vision and 
competence. Charges of provincial governments being imprudent in 
their dealings and bereft of foresight in their planning were all too 
72 AJHR 1864 B-02, 18–19, 29–30 and 33.
73 Ibid., 32, 34.
74 Crown agents Julyan and Sargeant to Reader Wood, 23 July 1864, ibid., 34–35.
75 N. M. Chappell, New Zealand Banker’s Hundred: A History of the Bank of New Zealand 
1861–1961 (Wellington: Bank of New Zealand, 1961), 82–85.
76 Attard, ‘Colonial State’, 119.
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justified.77 Rash development generated by inter-provincial rivalry was 
no basis for sensible projects, and the central government had already 
taken responsibility for building the colony’s telegraph network.78 
However, the wartime demand for central borrowing meant prompt 
measures were essential for the colony to maintain creditworthiness. 
In 1865 Southland and its creditors looked to the General Assembly for 
a solution to the province’s ills, with far-reaching consequences. The 
central government took on Southland’s debt, with the province’s land 
revenue impounded to cover costs. To avoid further disasters, all future 
provincial loans required parliamentary approval before they could 
receive the governor’s assent.79 This restriction was soon used for two 
small Wellington loans, allowing one to be negotiated at a better rate, 
but as Morrell notes, this ‘offered such an obvious inducement to log-
rolling in the Assembly that it might have become dangerous’.80
The time was ripe for a reorganisation of New Zealand’s finances. The 
provinces were servicing loans valued at £2,739,000 at interest of 6–10 
percent and had almost nothing to show for them.81 Only Canterbury, 
with its tunnel nearing completion and a small railway network already 
operational, could claim any real success. Southland’s railway was 
effectively inoperative, the gold rush boom times had moved to the 
West Coast, and the province was moribund. In the North, construction 
of a railway from Auckland to the Waikato was abandoned amid severe 
allegations of financial incompetence, while Wellington’s ambitions 
for a railway to the Wairarapa were made ludicrous by the fact that 
its roads were poorly formed, public sanitation and drainage were 
constant problems, and only hotel lamps provided public lighting.82 This 
crisis of debt was not an inevitable outcome rooted in structural flaws. 
77 Wanganui Chronicle, 3 August 1864, cited in Press, 13 August 1864, 3; Alfred Saunders 
(Nelson Superintendent 1865–67), History of New Zealand, vol. 2 (Christchurch: Smith, 
Anthony, Sellars, and Co., 1899), 127.
78 The first telegraph lines were built and operated by the provinces but early difficulties 
led the central government to take responsibility; see A. C. Wilson, Wire and Wireless: A 
History of Telecommunication in New Zealand, 1860–1987 (Palmerston North: Dunmore 
Press, 1994), 27–36.
79 Southland Provincial Debt Act, 29 Victoria 1865, no. 68.
80 Morrell, Provincial System, 187.
81 AJHR 1868 A-09, 6. This total includes Southland’s debt, not included in the official 
provincial figures as the debt had been guaranteed by the central government, as well 
as £400,000 of debentures that had been authorised but not raised and were taken up 
by the central government at consolidation.
82 For Auckland see Daily Southern Cross, 17 August 1867, 3; for Wellington see Alan 
Mulgan, The City of the Strait: Wellington and Its Province; A Centennial History 
(Wellington: Wellington Provincial Centennial Council, 1939), 193–4.
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Administrative bungling on the provinces’ behalf had led money to be 
frittered away on incomplete and botched projects.
The central government’s solution was to centralise debt and prohibit 
provincial borrowing, closing even the parliamentary avenue to loans. 
War expenditure was happily declining at the same time as ordinary 
revenue was increasing.83 Stafford, who resumed the premiership when 
Weld’s ministry fell in October 1865, therefore had a good opportunity 
to resolve the poor credit of the provinces by using the improving 
credit and security of the colony as a whole. As the central government 
was the more powerful and creditworthy borrower, it could negotiate 
a consolidation of provincial and central loans on terms favourable to 
centralism. The consolidation offered colonial securities in exchange 
for provincial, with a loan raised to finance the conversion; provincial 
debts became charges by the central government upon the provinces that 
incurred them. A province’s share of consolidated revenue would only be 
paid after the deduction of annual charges for the consolidated loan.84 
Further provincial loans were prohibited, even though Stafford in 1866 
had forecast a reconsideration of how provincial loans would be regulated 
rather than a ban on them.85 Powerful provinces such as Canterbury and 
Otago were appalled, but the London money market viewed Stafford’s 
consolidation favourably.86 The influence of gentlemanly capitalism 
gave centralists valuable support in the face of provincialist outrage. 
The power of metropolitan credit, however, was not absolute. It did not 
effect a transformation of the entire political system – the provinces’ 
tasks had not been circumscribed and they possessed other revenue 
streams through customs, rates, fees, and licences. They were also free to 
implement direct taxation but never did so – the political culture of the 
time made this option unpopular during the 1860s and New Zealand’s 
first direct tax was not introduced until after abolition in 1878.87
Centralisation of debt solved immediate problems and stopped reckless 
provincial borrowing from damaging central creditworthiness, but it 
ignored underlying problems with the system. Likewise, by emphasising 
borrowing rather than public works, even the most perceptive analyses 
83 Rutherford, Grey, 565.
84 This scheme was enshrined to two associated acts – the Public Debts Act and Consolidated 
Loan Act, 31 Victoria, nos 89 and 90); for an extended analysis of the consolidated loan 
proposals and debate, see Morrell, Provincial System, 184–9.
85 Nelson Examiner, 30 August 1866, 3.
86 Edmund Bohan, Edward Stafford: New Zealand’s First Statesman (Christchurch: Hazard 
Press, 1994), 251.
87 Scotter, ‘Canterbury 1857–68’, 132–3; Jonathan Barrett and John Veal, ‘Land Taxation: 
A New Zealand Perspective’, eJournal of Tax Research 10, no. 3 (2012): 576–7.
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also overlook these problems. The burden of debt was symptomatic of 
public works inadequacies, and the difficulties of mobilising capital 
only came after mismanagement made the provinces look like a risky 
investment at a time of pronounced caution on the market. Worse still 
for the provinces, by attempting to sate substantial settler demand 
for public works via borrowing rather than other methods, they ran 
into competition with central war loans. When the failure of major 
public works threw impecunious provinces at the mercy of the central 
government, it was easy to revoke provincial power. In essence, trust in 
the provinces’ administrative abilities had evaporated.
However, having shaped the timing of the prohibition on provincial 
borrowing, the significance of war to centralisation dissipated. Ballantyne 
argues that
[w]ar not only enlarged the centralised state but also shifted 
political influence away from the provinces. In 1870, Julius 
Vogel, the Colonial Treasurer in the new government established 
by William Fox in 1869, set before the House an ambitious new 
programme of state-driven development.88
This jump from war to the Great Public Works Policy cannot be justified. 
As indicated above, problems of public works were entirely of the prov-
inces’ making and required resolution anyway. The question was more 
fundamental than Attard’s focus on who could raise greater loans or – 
as Ballantyne and Dalton would have it – whether war had shifted the 
centre of political gravity; it was a question of administrative ability 
and vision. The necessity of large-scale public works was apparent, but 
the provinces’ sustained inadequacy and incompetence indicated they 
might not be the most capable body to fund and oversee such projects. 
Vogel emphasised in 1870 that ‘the time has arrived when we must 
set ourselves afresh to the task of actively promoting the settlement 
of the country’.89 Accordingly he proposed a national railway network, 
major trunk roads, land purchases and immigration, to the tune of £10 
million. The key provincial tasks now became central responsibilities. 
Metropolitan credit was a component of this policy – included in the 
package of legislation that passed parliament was a £4 million loan – but 
what attracted electors and made the difference in determining the fate 
of provincialism was the vision offered by Vogel. In the words of the 
88 Ballantyne, ‘The State’, 117.
89 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 7 (1870), 102–08.
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Otago Daily Times, the Works Policy was a ‘social revolution’ and ‘[t]he 
current of our history … [has] entered into a new channel’.90 The debate 
between provincialism and centralism was effectively over. As the Daily 
Times put it, ‘Provincialism is virtually abolished. Its utter disappearance 
is a mere question of time’. Local plans conceived by narrow interests 
gave way to a policy of national breadth, attended by a substantial 
transfer of authority from provincial to central level. The provinces had 
been stripped of their main responsibilities after their administrative 
abilities were found wanting and, as a consequence, the justification for 
their existence became very flimsy.
Provincialists retaliated vigorously and although they won individual 
battles, the cause was lost. Vogel, an astute politician, recognised by 
1874 that public opinion had turned decisively against provincialism 
and that abolition would provide a truly national basis for his grand 
public works vision.91 The 1875–76 election was fought entirely as an 
ideological battle: abolition versus provincialism. Electors did not vote 
for centralists on the basis of financial data or assumptions about the 
power of markets, nor were they motivated by a war that had ended 
a few years previously; they made their decision on the basis of their 
judgement about which level of government had provided them with 
the trappings of modernity. The Works Policy captured the Pākehā 
imagination – finally an authority was taking action to satisfy settlers’ 
needs. The national railway network grew quickly, from 74 kilometres in 
1870 to 872 in 1875.92 Over a third of New Zealand’s entire railway net-
work was built in the 1870s. The Works Policy’s progress and the central 
government’s success were apparent as railway tentacles stretched from 
towns in every province into neglected hinterlands. Regional areas 
consistently returned abolitionist candidates, as did smaller provinces. 
Only Auckland and Otago resisted, and even their sup port for provincialist 
candidates sometimes requires qualification.93 The electorate’s verdict 
was clear: provincialism was rejected, and the Abolition Act came into 
operation on 1 November 1876.
90 Otago Daily Times, 14 September 1870, 2.
91 Raewyn Dalziel, Julius Vogel: Business Politician (Auckland: Auckland University Press 
1986), 173–4.
92 New Zealand Official Yearbook, 1894. Another 747 kilometres were under construction in 
1875.
93 Southland, for example, was abolitionist, but elected provincialists in the hope they 
would secure a superior form of local government in the wake of abolition, or would 
make Dunedin more responsive to Southland’s complaints if abolition failed (Olssen, 
‘Loyalty and Localism’, 87).
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Conclusion
The role of war in New Zealand’s centralisation was largely confined 
to influencing the timing of debt consolidation. Problems with the 
provision of public works and development that prompted electors to 
abandon provincialism existed independently of war. This does not mean 
warfare was irrelevant to provincialism, but its direct effects were few. It 
destabilised Taranaki, creating an extra burden on the system, and the 
Settlements Act was a harbinger that central and provincial governments 
would struggle to work together. However, the poor execution of the 
Settlements Act reflected badly on both tiers of government and the 
measure did not achieve any substantial transfer of power. Other central 
attempts to usurp provincial authority, such as the construction of 
public works for primarily military purposes, were of little significance 
or limited applicability. Warfare’s greatest contribution to centralisation 
was through the collision of provincial and central loans in London, 
which deepened the provinces’ borrowing woes and heightened the 
need for a resolution. Nonetheless, this was just one step on the road 
to abolition: the refashioning of New Zealand’s political institutions 
was not an inevitable result of any structural incompatibility with 
metropolitan credit markets but primarily a response to provincial 
maladministration.
Leaping from warfare to the Works Policy is unwarranted, as public 
works failures provide a direct path to Vogel’s momentous proposals. 
Mismanagement of and reckless borrowing for provincial public works 
achieved little, and when the provinces were stripped of borrowing powers 
in 1867 the door to centralisation was already open wide as provincially-
administered infrastructural development stagnated. Vogel did have an 
eye on pacifying the central North Island through public works and the 
spread of Pākehā civilisation, an objective he increasingly emphasised 
later in life.94 However, his primary emphasis in 1870 was stimulating 
the work of colonisation that the provinces had botched, and this emph-
asis captivated New Zealand. It is unnecessary to assume the forces of 
gentlemanly capitalism were the primary mover; local events were more 
than sufficient to convince electors that the provinces had outlived their 
usefulness. The provinces were doomed by their own failures, not by war 
or markets, and became ensnared by the compression of time and space 
created through a successful central program of development.
94 Dalziel, Vogel, 105–6.
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